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I.
My friend Fred Zacharias was a stubborn and in many ways an
unreasonable man. That is why I liked him. He was also a very decent
man, which is why I admired him. To say he was decent is not to damn
with faint praise, for decency is underrated in the law, or so I argue
below. I miss my conversations about legal ethics with Fred, so for my
argument I take this opportunity to continue one of them.
II.
Fred had two main academic concerns. He wanted the rules of
professional conduct to have coherent purposes and to adopt means
reasonably calculated to achieve those purposes. Our discussions on this
topic were short. I maintained the rules had a coherent purpose, at least
insofar as they deviated from agency law principles: to make life easier
and more profitable for lawyers. The mandatory rules tend to cut costs,
while the discretionary rules make room to maximize income. The
claim is not uniformly true, I admit, but it explains more than any
competing theory and does so more simply.1
Fred would listen indulgently to my reductionist rants and smile an
amused smile. He would not necessarily disagree with me, and he
would point out that he himself dabbled in law and economics from time
to time. He would insist, though, that there was another, more charitable
* Lyle L. Jones Professor of Competition and Innovation Law, University of San
Diego School of Law.
1. For example, it does not explain Model Rule 3.8, setting forth ethical obligations of
prosecutors.
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way to look at the rules, and he held out hope that they could be
improved.
Fred’s insistence drew strength from his second main concern, which
is my topic here. Fred worried about the abuse of power. He knew
power must be located somewhere and that locating it anywhere puts
some persons at risk. He cared about the potential victims of power—
often reminding me of his background as a public interest lawyer and
contrasting it with my own work for big companies—but his concern
went deeper than that.
Fred was concerned about how power affects those who hold it. His
concern was fundamental, rooted in very old-fashioned notions of
propriety—some things are simply “not done.” In his work he chose the
term integrity to describe what he had in mind. I prefer a different term
to describe the light that came to Fred’s eyes when we ventured into
certain territory. In my terms, Fred insisted on a role in legal ethics for
the maddeningly diffuse but absolutely fundamental notion of decency.
The nature of discretion offers a good example of this aspect of Fred’s
thinking, and I explore his views through a particular problem he and I
debated. Here it is: Disciplinary rules permit but do not require lawyers
to disclose a client’s intention to injure or kill a third party.2 The ABA’s
rules, though not California’s, also permit disclosure to prevent or rectify
financial harm to a third party caused by dealings in which the lawyer’s
services were used.3 Assume clients prefer that lawyers not disclose
their planned or consummated crimes or frauds, and that lawyers
intuitively understand this preference. May a lawyer act on this
understanding by promising clients never to blow the whistle on them,
thereby competing more effectively for their work?
In a piece I wrote several years ago I recounted a conversation with
Fred in which he argued that a grant of discretion to a lawyer to disclose
client misconduct might be read to imply that the lawyer actually must
exercise that discretion. On this view a lawyer may not promise clients
never to disclose their misdeeds, for to do so would be to disavow the
discretion lawyers are bound to exercise.4 Fred later articulated this

2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2010); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3-100 (2010).
3. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2010), with
CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100.
4. David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal To Grant
Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1825, 1825 n.1 (2004).
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view in a very fine piece with Bruce Green,5 and he alluded to it in
several other pieces as well.6
I did not say much about Fred’s argument when we discussed the
issue. I think I told him I could not see disciplinary boards actually
pursuing such a theory and that “may” is an awfully odd way of saying
“must.” I may have added that in my view lawyers in fact do cultivate
reputations for silence, but they do so by not disclosing rather than by
promising not to disclose. The implication was that the duty to exercise
discretion that Fred contemplated either was commonly violated or,
more likely, just did not exist. Fred smiled his amused smile and said I
should not be so quick; I needed to expand my view of what the rules
might do.
III.
I never was persuaded by Fred’s view, but I always admired the
convictions I saw behind it. It is those convictions I want to assess here.
I said above that Fred believed there might be an argument that lawyers
may not bind themselves not to blow the whistle on clients under
circumstances when the rules permit them to do so. What might that
argument look like?
One argument for such a position takes the form of a third-party
beneficiary theory. The claim would be that the intended or actual
victims of client misconduct are intended beneficiaries of the lawyer’s
ability to disclose, and the lawyer wrongs them by promising never to
use that ability. A variation on this theme is the claim that the exception
allowing disclosure aims to grant third parties some degree of protection
by not subjecting to punishment lawyers who might try to help them.
Lawyers who promise not to help third parties, the argument goes,
frustrate this purpose.

5. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional
Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 178 (2008); Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 541, 568 (2009) [hereinafter Zacharias, Integrity Ethics]; Fred C.
Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes: Are Lawyers Rational Actors?, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 671, 685 (2009); Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 73, 99 (2007); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1147, 1186 (2009).
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The third-party beneficiary argument seems to me unsound because
the rule grants third parties no right to be warned by lawyers who
represent harm-causing clients. The rules themselves state that they are
not intended to create causes of action,7 and anyone familiar with
lawyers’ paranoia over this subject should be quick to conclude that the
ABA did not intend to create Tarasoff liability by allowing such
disclosure.8 California was even clearer on this point.9 The best
explanation for expansion of the ABA rule to allow disclosure to prevent
or rectify financial harm is actually a self-interested one: lawyers saw
momentum for reform building in the wake of various corporate
scandals and changed the rule in an effort to control reform rather than
have it imposed on them.10 A lawyer who promises not to warn therefore
deprives third parties of nothing to which they are legally entitled.
The purposive claim seems to me to falter as well. The rule was
changed to permit disclosure without risk of discipline. That purpose is
fulfilled when lawyers are free to disregard discipline as a reason for
acting. The language of the rule does not foreclose lawyers from
restraining themselves, and no such interpretation is needed to
accomplish the rather narrow purpose the exception aims to fulfill.
I rehearse these arguments because I know well that Fred was fully
aware of them and understood their significance. Rejoinders to the
third-party beneficiary argument did not bother him because he was
making a different argument. He viewed exceptions to the general
confidentiality rule as “integrity exception[s].”11 By this he meant the
exception was one of a particular type of rule “designed to assure that
lawyers do not take the demands of role too far. These provisions
encourage lawyers to act in the same way as other moral individuals
when systemic conditions do not demand a departure from ordinary
behavior.”12 For Fred, these rules serve as a reminder that lawyers “do
not shed the obligation to behave ethically—and should not even adopt a
position of amorality—just because they are members of the bar.”13

7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 20 (2010). Paragraph 14 in the
scope note to the ABA rules reinforces this conclusion; it states that certain rules “generally
cast in the term ‘may,’ are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the
lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be
taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion.”
Id. para. 14.
8. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing
failure to warn theory of liability against psychotherapists in some circumstances).
9. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(E).
10. McGowan, supra note 4.
11. See Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, supra note 6, at 572–73.
12. Id. at 545.
13. Id.
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But how does a permissive exception with so few teeth serve this
function? Fred rightly found the answer by looking to the context in
which lawyers must decide to disclose or remain silent. He pointed out
that lawyers operate under a general command not to use or disclose
client confidences. For lawyers, silence is normal and requires no
explanation; disclosure deviates from this norm. In addition, lawyers are
taught and may believe that silence is necessary to maintain client trust.
The salience of this concern might lead them to underestimate the social
value of stopping or rectifying client harm. Finally, Fred well knew that
lawyers’ economic interests reinforce the norm of silence. No one is
likely to land a future client by pointing out they blew the whistle on the
last one.
Against the background of these constant features of practice, Fred
saw the exception allowing disclosure of confidential information as a
“moral reminder” to lawyers that they may “act with the same moral
impulses as ordinary citizens.”14 For Fred these impulses were clear:
one must safeguard others unless doing so causes fear for one’s own
safety.15 To the extent one cares about actually preventing lawyers from
contracting away their right to act morally, Fred understood the rules
might need tweaking. His point was that the need for alteration did not
imply that the exception is meaningless as written. It serves to remind
lawyers of something the circumstances of practice may lead them to
forget: they are human.
IV.
Appeals to “integrity” and similar concepts always break down if they
are pushed too hard. One cannot use them to prove anything in the sense
of a logical entailment. Whatever proof one might conceive will have
the form, as Arthur Leff so memorably put it, of a definition asserted
early in the game and whispered much later as a conclusion.16
Here is how easy it is. Take integrity and the exception allowing
disclosure to avoid or remedy client harm. What are we actually talking
about? It is an obvious mistake to start the analysis at the moment the
lawyer learns what the client did or plans to do. We have to go back to
14. Id. at 573.
15. Id. at 572–73.
16. Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism,
60 VA. L. REV. 451, 454 (1974).
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the point when the lawyer induces the client to confide in her. Having
succeeded in cultivating trust the lawyer then, for reasons of her own—
call them moral if you will, but they are hers and not the client’s—
betrays the trust she cultivated. Where is the integrity in that?
The argument then takes a series of very familiar turns. The lawyer
replies that the client is doing or has done wrong and has no right to
expect the lawyer to hide his conduct. Suppose that is so (though
betraying a wrongdoer is not obviously justified; after all, two wrongs
need not make a right). What about clients in general? Will not other
clients learn of the lawyer’s disloyalty and distrust their own lawyers
even when they intend no wrong? Why do wrong in many cases to do
right in one? Except, of course, there is no way to prove any of this.
The moves are just nice—because possibly true—rhetorical moves.
They are unproved and probably unprovable assertions flying past each
other at ever-greater speeds and volume. How dreary.
So far as I know, Fred never engaged this problem directly when
discussing his integrity exception. He recurred instead to the “moral
impulses of ordinary citizens” and the notion of the ordinary moral
individual. I think the key word here is ordinary. Fred understood that
people are imperfect. They tend to do what they can, but what they can
do depends on their circumstances. The common sense and common
practice of a community is one of the most important of those
circumstances.
Fred knew that. He knew as well that in legal ethics at least two sets
of communities always have claims to assert: professional communities
of lawyers and the broader communities in which they practice.
Professional communities vary in many ways and have widely disparate
views—prosecutors and defense lawyers are both members of such
communities after all—but they share a sense that there is such a thing
as a lawyer’s role, and they share as well the sense that they have agreed
to assume that role. How far it extends is therefore a common concern
for lawyers. It is a concern as well to any community in which lawyers
practice, for the nonlawyers in that community will feel the effects of
different conceptions of proper and improper lawyerly conduct. The
exception allowing lawyers to disclose client misconduct straddles a
boundary between the claims of these communities: confidentiality is a
core element of the lawyer’s role, but it is nonlawyer members of the
community who are likely to suffer from an excessive commitment to
confidentiality.
For Fred, I think, integrity rules are a way for lawyers to remind
themselves of the claims of these different communities and of the need
to navigate the boundaries of those claims with care. His argument
rightly implied that it is not only unrealistic for lawyers to pretend they
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can ignore the moral claims of the broader communities in which they
work but probably unhealthy as well. Counterexamples may be found—
the common morality of Southern States in the 1950s and 1960s was not
a sound guide to lawyer’s ethics, though it was asserted that way17—but
in general the point is both right and important.
It is in this respect that I read Fred’s argument as showing his concern
for the abuse of power. In a society as legalistic as ours, lawyers have
power. Clients who need help must confide in their lawyers. Possession
of these confidences gives lawyers power over their clients, a fact
prominent in nineteenth-century writings on legal ethics. The
confidentiality obligations of agency law and, later, rules of professional
conduct seek to constrain this power by requiring that it be exercised
only for the client’s benefit. In this respect the rules protect clients from
lawyers but the constraint creates new risks: lawyers may be disabled
from protecting innocent persons at risk of harm or from aiding persons
who have been harmed already⎯thus the exception to the constraining
rule.
Fred’s integrity exception therefore reflects the inescapable problem
that power must be created but, once created, may be misused. Power to
harm a client may be power to save a member of the community.
Whose claims should prevail? Fred did not pretend to answer that
question. By implication he rejected any categorical answer. The only
sensible answer—and, I think, Fred’s answer—is that it depends. It
depends on the relative strength of the claims of each community in a
particular situation.
Thus, for Fred the point of the integrity exception was that the claims
of each community count. Because lawyers invariably attend to the
claims of whatever legal community they are a part, Fred insisted that
integrity rules serve an important function in drawing lawyers’ attention
to the full range of claims morally worthy of consideration in a given
case. Doing so entails no answer, but that is not the point; the point
instead is that to act morally one must take all morally relevant
considerations into account.
As I mentioned earlier, I am not sure integrity is the right term to
describe the exception we have been considering or the class of rules of
which it is a member. The term is too closely associated with notions of
honesty and incorruptibility, and, for me at least, it therefore does not
17.

See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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capture the importance of “ordinary” moral considerations. I prefer an
equally imprecise but humbler term: decency.
The term came to mind as I thought about my discussions with Fred
on this topic, and it did so through an unusual route. In a justly
celebrated essay on Charles Dickens, Orwell wrote that Dickens’s moral
message “is one that at first glance looks like an enormous platitude: If
men would behave decently the world would be decent.”18 Thus, Orwell
points out, in Dickens’s novels bad situations often get better because
powerful (rich) men act decently.19 But Orwell also saw in Dickens a
deep hatred of tyranny and thus a central problem implied by Dickens’s
work: “how to prevent power from being abused.”20 The problem was
unsolved and is in fact insoluble. But from that perspective, “‘[i]f men
would behave decently the world would be decent’ is not such a
platitude as it sounds.”21
Orwell was right. The difference between a platitude and an
indispensible insight often depends on how seriously one takes the
problem to which the platitude pertains. Fred took the abuse of power
seriously, so he took the problem of integrity—decency, in my
terms⎯seriously. He offered no algorithms or categorical answers. He
insisted instead that lawyers take seriously the moral claims of each
community in which they worked and affected; he insisted that lawyers
not pretend the claims of their own community are always entitled to
prevail. He knew no ready answer can withstand engagement with the
conflicting claims lawyers face. He insisted that the best that can be
done in such cases is to remember that decency has a role in law, which
suffers when lawyers pretend otherwise.
Decency has one other virtue as a description of Fred’s argument.
May Sarton once wrote that in modern times “[o]ne must think like a
hero to behave like a merely decent human being.”22 She was not
writing about lawyers, but Fred saw the truth of that sentiment for our
profession. He sensed a hero shortage in our line of work, and he hoped
the rules could do a little to help make up the deficiency. He hoped so
because he was a truly decent man.

18. GEORGE ORWELL, Charles Dickens, in 1
AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 413, 417 (Sonia

THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM
Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1968).
19. Good men but not lawyers. Tulkinghorn’s pursuit of Lady Dedlock is the
quintessential example of lawyers abusing the power that goes with obtaining a client’s
confidences.
20. ORWELL, supra note 18, at 427–28.
21. Id. at 428.
22. MAY SARTON, JOURNAL OF A SOLITUDE 101 (1973).
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V.
I do not know if Fred would agree with my reading of his arguments.
I like to think he would, but I am fairly sure he would have corrections.
I wish I knew what they were. I would learn from them. So would we
all.
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